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Abstract
This paper estimates the process of search and matching between entrepre-
neurs and nanciers in the business angel (BA) market. We hand-collect a new
dataset from the BA markets of 17 developed countries for the period 1996-2014,
and we estimate the aggregate matching function, which captures the number
of successful deals as a function of the number of potential entrepreneurs and of
business angels. Empirical ndings conrm the technological features assumed
in the theoretical literature: positive and decreasing marginal returns to both
inputs (stepping on toes e¤ect), technological complementarity across the two
inputs (thick market e¤ect) and constant returns to scale (CRS). As we show,
evidence on CRS rules out equilibrium multiplicity in the BA market. We discuss
the policy implications of these ndings.
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1 Introduction
In recent years the market for entrepreneurial nance -that is, nance provided to
risky, innovative ventures- has received increasing attention in the economic and nan-
cial literature (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 2014). Although still representing a small
fraction of the overall investments in innovation, funds provided by such institutions as
venture capitalists and business angels are rapidly growing in size and in prominence.1
For instance, a recent study by the OECD (2011) shows that the number of angel
networks operating in the US and in Europe has roughly tripled in the ten years from
1999 to 2009. Moreover, the amount of investments provided by business angels and
the number of deals have been increasing during the 2000s despite the nancial crisis.
Finally, these investments tend to be concentrated in the most innovative sectors. For
instance, in Europe and in the US, biotechnology, ICT and environmental technologies
absorb around 60% of the overall angel investments (OECD, 2011).
The market for entrepreneurial nance can be essentially described as one in which
potential entrepreneurs search for funds to nance their ideas, and nanciers (or capi-
talists) search for good ideas to nance. In this perspective, a start-up enterprise is the
result of a successful matching between the demand and the supply side of the market.
Depicting entrepreneurial nance as a search and matching process between entre-
preneurs and nanciers, rather than via the traditional demand and supply apparatus,
has become a consolidated practice in the economic literature of entrepreneurship, and
it is rooted into solid theoretical foundations.2 In the real world, market participants
-whether entrepreneurs or nanciers- are heterogeneous in their skills, location, beliefs,
preferences etc., and they are not perfectly informed about all market characteristics.
As a result, the meeting of demand and supply of nancial funds for entrepreneurship
is a costly and time consuming process. Search theory is a modeling tool that allows
1Business angels (also called angel investors) refer to wealthy individuals that invest their own
funds in entrepreneurial ventures, di¤erently from venture capitalists, that instead gather funds from
institutional investors, such as pension funds. Because of that, the amount invested in each project
by a business angel is, on average, considerably lower than the one invested by a venture capitalist.
They, however, share the following crucial feature: they are expected to contribute to the project
not only with nancial investments but also with managerial and technical expertise (Gompers and
Lerner, 1999).
2The inspiring idea of this stream of literature is clearly expressed in Phelps (2009). The most
relevant contributions for our purposes include Inderst and Muller (2004), Michelacci and Suarez
(2004), Keuschnigg (2003), Boadway et Al. (2005), Cipollone and Giordani (2015), Silveira and
Wright (2016).
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one to catch the most salient features of such frictional and decentralized markets as
the entrepreneurial nance market.3
The complex process of search and matching between demand and supply is usu-
ally and conveniently represented at aggregate level via the use of a matching function
(Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001). The rationale behind the matching function is the
possibility of capturing succintly all market imperfections and all dimensions of het-
erogeneity without the need to specify them.4 Indeed, whether the matching function
is a valid representation of the market for entrepreneurial nance ultimately rests on
its empirical adequacy. In the words of Petrongolo and Pisarrides (2001, p. 392), "like
the other aggregate functions [the] usefulness [of the matching function] depends on its
empirical viability and on how successful it is in capturing the key implications of the
heterogeneities and frictions in macro models". The main purpose of this paper is to
estimate the aggregate matching function, representing the number of successful deals
as a function of the number of would-be entrepreneurs and of nanciers, in the business
angel (BA) market, and to verify the technological features commonly assumed in the
theoretical literature.
Most of the theoretical literature looking at entrepreneurial nance as a search and
matching process assumes a well-behaved matching function (often in a Cobb-Douglas
form) with the following technological characteristics: (i) positive and decreasing mar-
ginal returns to both inputs (entrepreneurs and nanciers); (ii) a positve complemen-
tarity across the two inputs; (iii) costant returns to scale.5 The rst and the second
features are intuitive: the marginal e¤ect of an increase in the number of entrepreneurs
on the number of successful matches (i) is positive but decreasing in the number of
entrepreneurs -and, of course, the same holds for nanciers (stepping on toes e¤ect),
(ii) is increasing in the number of nanciers, and viceversa (thick market e¤ect). The
third feature, instead, deserves special attention.
In theoretical models where the market entry decision is endogenous, the e¢ ciency
of the search equilibrium is closely related to the returns to scale of the matching
function. In particular, if the matching function does not exhibit constant returns to
3Prior to nance, search theory has been extensively used in several elds of economics, such as
labor economics, monetary theory, and the theory of marriage. Rogerson et Al. (2005) contains a
survey of applications for the labor market but also a list of references for applications in other elds.
4Few papers delve into the microeconomic foundations of the search and bargaining frictions in the
entrepreneurial market. See, for instance, Silveira and Wright (2010, 2016), Chiu et Al. (2011).
5See, among others, Inderst and Muller (2004), Michelacci and Suarez (2004), Chiu et Al. (2011),
Cipollone and Giordani (2015).
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scale, the resulting equilibrium is certainly ine¢ cient.6 The assumption on the returns
to scale is then critical to evaluate the role of the policy maker, given that equilib-
rium ine¢ ciency is a classical argument in favor of policy intervention. Furthermore,
theoretical literature has shown that the scale elasticity of the matching function "dis-
ciplines" the number of equilibria admitted by the model.7 In particular, if returns
to scale are increasing, the model may admit more than one equilibrium, which also
would point to an active role of the policy maker. Providing empirical evidence on the
returns to scale is then useful to inform the debate on entrepreneurship policy (Parker,
2009). We go back to this issue in the concluding section.
In the theoretical section, we introduce formally the matching function and de-
scribe the technoogical characteristics commonly assumed. In Appendix A we embed
this matching technology into a parsimonious model of search and matching between
entrepreneurs and nanciers. In particular, the model describes the nancial market
for innovation as a "fair" in which the two sides of the market can meet bilaterally
and transform a "rough" entrepreneurial idea into a real start-up rm. While we do
not claim originality for this model (which is why we relegate it to the appendix), it
is however useful (i) to gain some perspective on the implications of the technological
hypotheses usually made and (ii) to state rigourosly the relationship between the num-
ber of equilibria and the returns to scale of the matching technology (Proposition 1),
as well as to give an economic interpretation to equilibrium multiplicity.
We then estimate the matching process between entrepreneurs and nanciers using
a unique, hand-collected dataset on innovative projects nanced by business angels.
We collect yearly data for the period 1996-2014 across 17 developed countries on (i)
the number of business angels (nanciers), (ii) the number of projects submitted to
them (potential entrepreneurs), (iii) the number of deals (successful matches). With
these data we estimate the aggregate matching function for the business angel market,
which takes the number of projects and angels as inputs and the number of deals as
output.
We consider several specications of the matching function. We start from a non-
linear estimation of a log-CES-type matching function. An estimated unitary elasticity
6More precisely, homogeneity of degree one of the matching function is a necessary but not su¢ cient
condition for the (constrained) Pareto e¢ ciency of the search equilibrium. The so called Hosios
conditions (stating that the input shares in the surplus of a match be equal to the input elasticities)
must also be satised (see Hosios, 1990 for details).
7Classical references are Diamond (1982) and Diamond (1984).
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of substitution, however, suggests to turn to a log-Cobb-Douglas matching function.
Finally, and in line with the empirical literature on matching function estimation, we
consider the more general form of trascendental logarithmic (or simply "translog")
matching function. Whatever the specic functional form assumed, the estimated
matching function systematically holds the technological characteristics assumed in
the theoretical literature: positive and decreasing marginal returns to both inputs and
positive technological complementarity across the two inputs. We also test the returns
to scale of the estimated matching function, and thus indirectly verify the empirical
plausibility of multiple equilibria. Empirical evidence tends to conrm a unitary scale
elasticity of the matching function, roughly suggesting that, in the business angel
market, multiple equilibria are unlikely.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce formally the matching
function and state our testable hypotheses. In Section 3 we carry out the empirical
analysis. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 Entrepreneurial Finance as a Search and Match-
ing Process
We describe the production process of new entrepreneurial ventures via the following
aggregate matching function:
M =M (LE; LK) ; (1)
where M;LE; LK denote, respectively, the number of successful matches, would-be
entrepreneurs and nanciers.
Theoretical models of search and matching typically assume positive and decreasing
marginal returns to both inputs, that is to say
(i) @M=@Lj > 0 and (ii) @2M=@L2j < 0 for j = E;K, (Hp 1)
implying that the number of matches is increasing in both inputs at decreasing rate.
The rationale behind part (ii) of (Hp 1) is that of capturing a sort of stepping on
toes e¤ect in the entrepreneurial nance market, that is, the idea that the individual
probability of a successful deal for an entrepreneur (M=LE) is decreasing in the number
of competing entrepreneurs (and the same for nanciers).
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A second commonly assumed technological feature deserving empirical scrutiny is
the existence of a positive complementarity across the two inputs. Two inputs are
technological complements when the marginal productivity of one input is increasing
in the use of the other input, that is, when the cross-partial derivative of the matching
function is strictly positive:
@M=@Lj@L j > 0 for j = E;K. (Hp 2)
In our context, this would imply that the impact of one additional potential en-
trepreneur on the output (of funded business ventures) is increasing in the number
of nanciers, and viceversa. This assumption captures the existence of a thick mar-
ket e¤ect, whereby the individual probability of a successful deal for an entrepreneur
(M=LE) is increasing in the number of nanciers (and viceversa).
Finally, the third common assumption made in the literature is the homogeneity of
degree one of the matching function, that is:
M (aLE; aLK) = aM (LE; LK) for a 2 R+. (Hp 3)
In the next section, we will verify (Hp 1), (Hp 2), and (Hp 3) against the available
data from the business angel market. In Appendix A at the end of the paper, we
further discuss these hypotheses and embed them into a formal model of search and
matching. In particular, we formally show that, far from being innocuous, the third
hypothesis is responsible for equilibrium uniqueness.
3 Estimating the Search and Matching Process
3.1 The Data on the Business Angel Market
A key challenge for our estimation of function (1) is the search of suitable data for
our three variables of interest, LE; LK ;M . As argued in the Introduction, the focus
on the business angels market is justied by its growing importance in the nancing
of innovative entrepreneurs. On the other hand, the scarcity of empirical work is due
to the lack of available data on the business angelsactivity.8 This paper represents
8One recent exception is Lerner et Al. (2015) who gather data on 13 angel investment groups
based in several countries to verify the e¤ectiveness of angel investments in improving the outcomes
and the performance of start-up rms in which they invest.
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a rst attempt to hand-collect the data necessary to explore the characteristics of the
matching process in the business angel market.
In the US, the Center for Venture Research (CVR) at the University of New Hamp-
shire reports yearly and quarterly information about the angel investor market in the
US as a whole, providing details on the number of active investors, the overall invest-
ment size by industry and by stage of investments, the contribution to job creation,
the yield rates (dened as the percentage of deals on the total number of submitted
projects) and the role of women and minority entrepreneurs.
In Europe, the European Association for Business Angels (EBAN) keeps the most
comprehensive record of visible business angel activity based on the information pro-
vided by European business angel networks (hereafter BANs), Federations of BANs,
individual business angels and other validated early stage investors which responded
to EBANs Survey. The Survey is conducted yearly and typically reports activities
which has taken place in the previous year. The collection of data is pursued through
a web form activated from the EBAN website or directly e-mailed to the Secretariat
of EBAN through a pre-formatted survey. The gures presented in each report are
therefore not representative of the entire European market. Moreover, the number of
respondents might di¤er yearly. Also the survey falls short on accounting for the so
called invisible market, which represents a relevant portion of the overall business
angelsinvestments (OECD, 2011). Yet, at the moment, the only available data are
those collected by angel associations from angel groups and networks.
Until 2009, EBANmade this information publicly available through its yearly docu-
ment "European directory of business angel networks in Europe", by reporting - where
available - aggregate country-specic information of the angel market size (namely, the
number of projects submitted to the angels, the number of angels, the number of deals
made and sometimes the average amount of the deal) along with a detailed breakdown
of the specic activities of each business angel operating in each country. Since 2010,
however, EBAN has chosen not to disclose further data on the activities of European
BAs and to retrieve the whole set of previously freely available information from its
website. Hence, for the countries whose aggregate information prior to 2010 is missing
and for updates from 2010, we have hand-collected data on thee three dimensions of
interest by exploring the institutional websites of each BAN.
As a result, our empirical analysis relies on data which, prior to 2010, are no
longer available to the general public, and from 2010 are collected via an accurate
data research on the institutional websites of each BAN. We have then assembled and
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created a unique and original dataset across 17 developed countries on 1) the total
number of entrepreneurial projects submitted to each business angel as a proxy for LE,
2) the number of business angels as a proxy for LK , and 3) the number of deals as
a proxy for M . We handle an unbalanced panel dataset of EU-15 countries (except
Luxembourg and Ireland), plus Norway, Poland, Russia and the US over the period
1996-2014. A summary description of these data is provided in Table 1.
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE
As shown in Table 1, the size of the angel market along our dimensions of interest
is remarkably di¤erent across countries and, within each country, over time (as shown
by the large value of the standard deviation). In particular, the anglosaxon countries
(UK and USA) display the largest number of business angels and of deals with a
signicantly increasing trend over the observed period, followed by the most populous
European countries (Germany and France). Although with a remarkably lower number
of business angels, as of 2010 Italy has been characterized by a number of submitted
projects and deals comparable to that of France. For the whole sample of countries,
the angel market size has roughly doubled in each dimension along our time span. In
particular, we have computed the growth rate of each dimension within each country,
and then we have taken the median values over the whole set of countries: we nd that,
between the beginning and the end of the period, the number of submitted projects,
business angels and deals in the median country has respectively grown by 91%, 140%
and 96%.
3.2 A CES-Type Matching Function
Using the data illustrated above, we carry out pooled and xed-e¤ect estimations of
di¤erent specications of the matching function starting with the logarithmic transfor-
mation of the following CES-type function:
Mi;t = A
h
E (LE)
	
i;t + K (LK)
	
i;t
i v
	
exp(cci;t + "i;t); (2)
where Mi;t is the number of deals in country i at time t; (LE)i;t and (LK)i;t are the
number of projects submitted and of business angels in country i at time t, respectively;
ci;t is a vector of controls; v is the return-to-scale parameter; E and K are share
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parameter (with E+K  1), A is a scale technology parameter. For this function, the
Hicks elasticity of substitution between the two input factors is given by  = 1= (1 	).
The CES collapses to a Cobb-Douglas function when  ! 1 (that is, when 	! 0).
We now test (Hp 1), (Hp 2) and (Hp 3) in specication (2) using the dataset
presented in the previous subsection. In particular, the hypothesis of positive marginal
returns to both inputs (part (i) of (Hp 1)) requires E; K ; v; A being strictly positive,
given that @Mi;t=@ (Lj)i;t = AvjL
	 1
j (j (Lj)
	
i;t+  j (L j)
	
i;t)
v
	
 1 exp(cci;t+ "i;t) (for
part (ii) of (Hp 1) on decreasing marginal returns see below).
(Hp 2) on the existence of a positive technological complementarity across the two
inputs is veried when the cross-partial derivative of (2), which is given by
@Mi;t
@ (Lj)i;t @ (L j)i;t
= Av (v  	) j j

(Lj)i;t (L j)i;t
	 1
(i (Lj)
	
i;t +  j (L j)
	
i;t)
v
	
 2
 exp(cci;t + "i;t);
is strictly positive. In addition to the parameter constraints stated above, this occurs
whenever (v  	) > 0. (Hp 3) on the homogeneity of degree one of (2), instead,
requires v = 1.
Finally, it can easily be demonstrated that positive input complementarity and
constant returns to scale imply marginal diminishing returns to both inputs (that is,
part (ii) of (Hp 1) is automatically veried whenever (Hp 2) and (Hp 3) hold true).9
The three hypotheses are tested against ve specications of (2), which di¤er with
respect to the set of controls included in vector ci;t. In model 1, the ci;t vector includes
a time trend only; model 2 adds country group dummies;10 model 3 adds interaction
terms between the time trend variable and the country group dummies; model 4 and
model 5 replicate models 2 and 3, respectively, but replace country group dummies
with country dummies. Including interaction terms between country identiers and
the time trend serves to capture the changing role of country-specic characteristics
on the observed evolution of the matching function in presence of an unbalanced panel
9In fact, on the one hand, v = 1 and (v  	) > 0 imply 	 < 1. On the other hand, after a
few algebraic steps we can write @2Mi;t=@ (Lj)
2
i;t = (	  1)AvjL	 2j  (j (Lj)	i;t+  j (L j)	i;t)
v
	 2 
 j (L j)
	
i;t exp(cci;t + "i;t) which is strictly negative whenever 	 < 1.
10Countries have been aggregated in the following ve groups: 1) Continental European countries
(Austria, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands); 2) Southern European countries (Italy, Spain,
Portugal and France); 3) Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden); 4) Eastern
European countries (Russia and Poland); 5) Anglosaxon countries (United Kingdom and the United
States).
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dataset.
The results from the nonlinear estimations of the log-CES matching function are
shown in Table 2.11 Estimates are in line with the theoretical predictions. In particular,
in all specications (i) parameters E; K;v; A are strictly positive (conrming part (i)
of (Hp 1)); (ii) v is signicantly positive and around 1, 	 is always not signicantly
di¤erent from zero, and the null hypothesis of the F-test on zero di¤erence between v
and 	 is rejected (verifying (Hp 2); (iii) the null hypothesis on the F-test on v = 1
cannot be rejected (signaling constant returns to scale, Hp 3). As claimed above, (Hp
2) and (Hp 3) imply part (ii) of (Hp 1).
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE
Finally, the fact that 	 is not signicantly di¤erent from zero suggests a unitary
elasticity of substitution between the two inputs. This induces us to consider, in the
next subsection, a Cobb-Douglas specication of the matching function.
3.3 A Cobb-Douglas Matching Function
Given a Cobb-Douglas matching function of the formMit = A (LE)
E
i;t (LK)
K
i;t exp(cci;t+
"i;t), we now estimate the following log-transformation:
mi;t = 0 + E (lE)i;t + K (lK)i;t + cci;t + "i;t (3)
where mi;t is the log of the number of deals in country i at time t; (lE)i;t and (lK)i;t
are the logs of the number of projects submitted and of the business angels in country
i at time t, respectively; ci;t is a vector of controls. Taken together, (Hp 1) and (Hp 2)
require E; K 2 (0; 1) and A > 0, while (Hp 3) on constant returns to scale implies
E + K = 1.
Function (3) is estimated via a robust regression approach to deal with the presence,
in the dataset, of outliers that can distort the ordinary least squares estimator (OLS).
By considering squared residuals, OLS tend to give an excessive importance to obser-
vations with very large residuals and, consequently, distort the parametersestimation
in presence of outliers. Adopting the graphical tool proposed by Rousseeuw and Van
11Estimates are computed using nonlinear least squares, and the residuals have an approximately
normal distribution.
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Zomeren (1990), Figure 1 shows that several outliers are present, suggesting that there
is a serious risk that the OLS estimator be strongly attracted by outliers (Rousseeuw
and Leroy, 1987).12 To tackle this issue, and following the traditional related litera-
ture (Hamilton, 1991), we adopt a version of robust regression by computing a highly
e¢ cient M-estimator, which represents a good compromise between excluding these
points entirely from the analysis and including all the data points and treating them
equally in OLS regression.13
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE
We estimate three specications of (3) which, as in the previous model, di¤er with
respect to the set of variables included in the vector of controls ci;t. In model 1, the
ci;t vector includes a time trend variable only; model 2 adds country groups dummies
and their interaction terms with the time trend variable; model 3 replicates model 2
but replaces country group dummies with country dummies.
Estimation results are shown in the rst three columns of Table 3 and are in line
with theoretical predictions. In particular, (Hp 1) and (Hp 2) are satised since the
share parameters are both signicantly positive and lower than one: a 1% increase in
the number of submitted projects (business angels) leads to positive increase in the
number of deals by between 0:37% (0:35%) and 0:64% (0:60%). The F-test on the
parameter restriction E + K = 1 cannot be rejected, thereby verifying the constant
returns to scale hypothesis (Hp 3).
12In particular, two observations for Belgium and Norway are bad leverage points, meaning that
their explanatory variables are slightly di¤erent from those of the rest of data and their outcomes
are higher than they should be according to the tted model. The collected data for US are large
good leverage points, suggesting that the characteristics of the US business angels market are rather
di¤erent from the other countries but that the number of deals is consistent with what the model
predicts. Finally, few other observations (i.e., for Italy, Portugal, Denmark, Netherlands and Poland)
are vertical outliers, being standard in their characteristics but more or less successful in terms of
number of deals than the model would suggest.
13The intuition behind the method is simple. In the classical OLS estimation, the objective is
to minimize the variance of the residuals. Given that the variance is sensitive to outliers, this may
result in distorted OLS estimates. The class of robust M-estimators instead minimize a measure of
dispersion of the residuals that is less sensitive to extreme values than the variance. On the basis of
the computed residuals, the most inuential points are dropped, and then cases with large absolute
residuals are down-weighted. See Hamilton (1991) for details.
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INSERT TABLE 3 HERE
3.4 A Translog Matching Function
By denition, a Cobb-Douglas matching function assumes that the elasticity of output
with respect to each input is constant, that is, that @mi;t=@ (lj)i;t = j. In this section,
we consider a generalization of model (3) - the so called trascendental logarithmic (or
simply, translog) matching function - in which the output elasticity is allowed to vary
with the values of both inputs.14
The translog function can be written as
mi;t = 0 + E (lE)i;t + K (lK)i;t + EK
h
(lE)i;t  (lK)i;t
i
+ (4)
+EE
h
(lE)i;t
i2
+ KK
h
(lK)i;t
i2
+ cci;t + "i;t:
Compared to the Cobb-Douglas, the translog adds (i) a log-interaction term between
the two inputs, in order to verify the existence of input complementarity not only in
levels but in elasticities (in which case EK would be signicantly positive) and (ii) the
squares of the two log-inputs to verify whether the elasticity of each input is decreasing
with the log-value of that input (that is, whether EE; KK < 0). The ci;t vector
includes country dummies and their interaction terms with the time trend variable.
The scale elasticity of a translog is dened by  = E + K , where E = E +
EK (lK)it + 2EE (lE)it is the elasticity of new deals with respect to the number of
submitted projects, and K = K + EK (lE)it + 2KK (lK)it is the elasticity of new
deals with respect to the number of BAs. Hence, input elasticities are assumed not to
be constant but to depend on the scales of both inputs. In the estimation, as usual
for the translog function, input elasticities and returns to scale will be evaluated at
the sample means of lE and lK . The function exhibits constant returns to scale when
 = 1.
Before moving to the empirical ndings, note that the three models (2), (3) and (4)
are all closely related to each other. The log-linear Cobb-Douglas matching function
(3) is clearly nested into the translog specication (4) (and thus obtainable from the
latter imposing the following restriction: EK = EE = KK = 0). On the other hand,
14Useful references for the translog are, among others, Warren (1996), Yashiv (2000) and Kan-
gasharju et al. (2005).
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the translog specication can be obtained from a second-order Taylor approximation
of the logarithmic transformation of the CES specication (2).15
Also model (4) is estimated via robust regression. Results are shown in column (4)
of Table 3. The estimated coe¢ cients of the matching function all have the expected
signs and are highly statistically signicant. In particular, the log-interaction term
(EK) is signicantly positive, meaning that the impact of a 1% increase in one input
(the number of business angels or the number of submitted projects) is increasing in
the log-value of the other input. This implies a stronger form of input complementarity
than that assumed in a Cobb-Douglas technology. On the other hand, the coe¢ cients
on the squared log-inputs (EE; KK) are signicantly negative, suggesting that the
impact of a 1% increase in one input is decreasing in the log-value of that input.
The two input elasticities, E and K , calculated at the sample mean of the explana-
tory variables lE,lK , are equal to 0:7175 and 0:2162 and, respectively, higher and lower
than those obtained under the Cobb-Douglas estimation. The resulting scale elasticity
of the matching function,  = E + K is then equal to 0:9337. As with the previous
two model specications, even in this case the null hypothesis of constant returns to
scale ( = 1) cannot be rejected.
4 Concluding Remarks
This paper has described the market for entrepreneurial nance as a decentralized
market in which entrepreneurs and nanciers search and match with each other. After
introducing a standard aggregate matching technology to capture such relationship, we
have specied the most common hypotheses imposed in the literature (and in Appendix
A we have explicitly demonstrated that such hypotheses have important theoretical and
policy implications). Using a new, hand-collected dataset on the business angel market,
we have then estimated and compared three di¤erent specications of the matching
function (CES, Cobb-Douglas and Translog), and we have veried empirically the
previously stated hypotheses. Across all model specications, the matching function
exhibits positive and decreasing marginal productivities of its two inputs, a positive
degree of technological complementarity between them and constant returns to scale.
15More precisely, when the elasticity of substitution is in the neighborhood of unity, a two-input
log-CES function may be approximated by a Taylor expansion which has the form of (4) under the
following restrictions: EK =  2EE =  2KK (Kmenta, 1967).
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We wish to conclude this paper putting our main ndings in a policy perspective.
The role of public policy in fostering entrepreneurial activity is a rather controversial
issue. At one end of the spectrum, policy enthusiasts claim that, behind every successful
story of entrepreneurial innovation (from the Silicon Valley to the Singapore venture
capital industry), the role of public policy has always been crucial, especially at the
very early stages of development. In the words of Lerner (2010, p.42), "every hub of
cutting-edge entrepreneurial activity in the world today had its origins in proactive
government intervention".16 At the other end, policy detractors tend to emphasize the
limits of policy intervention -for instance, in terms of the governments incompetence
or capture by special interests- and provide evidence of failed and expensive measures
of public stimulus to private entrepreneurship (the so called "boulevard of broken
dreams", Lerner, 2010).
As already mentioned in the Introduction, this policy debate is partly inspired by
the theoretical literature. Generally speaking, models admitting multiple equilibria
provide a powerful narrative behind the need for policy intervention: as equilibrium
multiplicity implies the existence of coordination failures -that is, of equilibria charac-
terized by sub-optimally low paces of economic activity-, government intervention may
serve to spur a virtuous cycle, that is, to favor the coordination of economic agents
towards a superior equilibrium conguration.
In this paper we contribute to inform this policy debate. Evidence on the con-
stant returns to scale of the matching process in the business angel market indicates
equilibrium uniqueness. Hence, this paper adds a note of prudence in evaluating the
opportunity of public e¤orts to boost entrepreneurship in this peculiar market. Need-
less to say, this evidence is far from conclusive in any dimension, and further work
remains to be done in this as well as in the other relevant markets for entrepreneurial
nance.
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A The Theoretical Framework
The model we introduce in this section is a simple, dynamic, partial-equilibrium model
of search and matching between entrepreneurs and nanciers. The basic framework
introduced in Subsection A1 is a slightly simplied version of the one presented in
Cipollone and Giordani (2015) and is inspired by the classical "coconut model" by
Diamond (1982). Subsection A2 discusses the issue of equilibrium multiplicity inside
this framework.
A.1 The Fair of Innovation
The world is populated by E entrepreneurs and K nanciers who must decide whether
to participate or not in a "fair" of new ideas. New ideas arrive randomly to the
entrepreneurs according to a Poisson process with parameter . However, in order for
such ideas to become marketable innovations, entrepreneurs need to meet nanciers and
convince them about their protability. This process of search and matching occurs
inside the fair. Hence, the model revolves around the entry decisions of these two types
of agents, which depend on the costs and benets of attending the fair.
For entrepreneurs each new idea is associated with an entry cost, denoted by cE,
which is idiosyncratically drawn from a c.d.f. F (cE) in the support [0; cE]. Financiers
entry costs, denoted by cK , are instead distributed according to a c.d.f. G (cK) in the
support [0; cK ]. cE and ck may also be thought as inversely capturing, respectively, the
quality of the new idea and the managerial talent of the nancier.
The expected benet for entrepreneurs (nanciers) is given by the chance of match-
ing the right nancier (entrepreneur) -and, hence, of transforming the new idea into a
protable rm-, multiplied by the total prots associated with the new entrepreneur-
ial venture. This expected benet is obtained via a standard dynamic programming
argument. In particular, we determine the values of being inside and outside the fair
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for each type of agent, so that the expected benet from fair participation is given by
the di¤erence between these two values.
The value of being outside the fair, respectively denoted by V 0E for entrepreneurs
and V 0K for nanciers, is dened by the two following asset equations:
rV 0E = 
cEZ
0
 
V 1E   V 0E   cE

dF (cE) ; (A1)
rV 0K = V
1
K   V 0K   cK ;
where r is the exogenous riskless interest rate, and V 1E ; V
1
K denote the values of being
inside the fair for entrepreneurs and nanciers, respectively dened by17
rV 1E = E + V
0
E   V 1E ; (A2)
rV 1K = K

(1  ) + V 0K   V 1K

:
In the two equations above,  is total instantaneous innovation prots,  2 (0; 1)
is the entrepreneursshare of these prots, and E; K denote the instantaneous prob-
abilities of matching for, respectively, entrepreneurs and nanciers attending the fair.
The production process of new entrepreneurial ventures is captured by the aggregate
matching function (1). Hence, the instantaneous probabilities of matching are given
by E = M=LE and K = M=LK , where LE; LK denote, respectively, the stocks of
entrepreneurs and nanciers currently inside the fair.
The previous equations have the usual interpretations. Equation (A1) captures the
entrepreneursreturn from being outside the fair as the instantanous probability of a
new idea times the corresponding payo¤, which is given by the capital gain associated
with participating in the fair minus the entry cost. Equation (A2) represents the entre-
preneursreturn from being inside the fair as the chance of matching the right nancier
times the share of innovation prots, plus the capital gain or loss associated with exiting
from the fair. An analogous interpretation holds for the nanciersequations.18
As a result, the benet from entering into the fair is given by the di¤erence V 1E V 0E
for entrepreneurs and V 1K   V 0K for nanciers. In equilibrium, there exist an inframar-
ginal entrepreneur and an inframarginal nancier for whom entry cost equalizes entry
17Given our focus onon the steady state, we have imposed _V hj = 0 for h = 0; 1 and j = E;K.
18The di¤erence between the entrepreneursand the nancierspairs of equations is simply due to
the fact that, when assessing the value of being outside the fair, each entrepreneur does not know
the value of her idea (because she is waiting for one), while each nancier knows her talent (which is
time-invariant).
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benet, that is, cj = V
1
j   V 0j for j = E;K. After some elementary algebra, we obtain
the two optimal entry conditions as
cE =
E + 
cEZ
0
cEdF (cE)
1 + r + F (cE)
(A3)
cK =
K (1  )
1 + r
(A4)
linking the threshold cost cj to the probability of successful matching j (with j =
E;K).19
A.2 Coordination Failures in the Financial Market of Innova-
tion
We are now ready to characterize the stationary equilibrium/equilibria of the model.
Along the steady state, the inows and outows from the fair of innovation must be
equal for both entrepreneurs and nanciers, that is
_LE =  (E   LE)F (cE)  LE  E = 0; (A5)
and
_LK = (K   LK)G (cK)  LK  K = 0; (A6)
where LE  E = LK  K = M . The two equations above capture, respectively, the
evolution of entrepreneurs and nanciers over time: along the steady state, the number
of entrepreneurs deciding to participate in the fair ( (1  LE)F (cE)) must equalize
the number of entrepreneurs who have successfully matched with nanciers and have
thus exited from the fair (LE  E) (an analogous interpretation can be given to the
second equation).
A stationary equilibrium for this economy is dened as any 4-tuple (LE; LK ; cE; c

K)
that solves the four equations (A3), (A4), (A5) and (A6). In search and matching
models, the possibility of multiple equilibria is due to the presence of a thick market
externality (whereby the entrepreneurspayo¤ from market participation is increasing
in the number of nanciers, and viceversa). The next proposition formally links the
19The relation is obviously positive: an increase in the probability of a successful matching (j)
leads to an increase in the cuto¤ value of the entry cost cj .
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number of stationary equilibria to the returns to scale of the matching function (which
govern the strength of this externality).
Proposition 1 If the matching function (1) is homogeneous of degree 1, the economy
admits one and only one stationary equilibrium.
Proof. First pose 
  LK=LE. Given that (1) has CRS, we can write E M=LE =
m (
), and K  M=LK = (1=
)m (
). The entry conditions, (A3) and (A4), are
then both functions of 
 only, the former increasing, the latter decreasing, that is,
cE

+



and cK
 



. By substituting these functions respectively into (A5) and (A6),
we obtain
LE =
EF (cE (
))
1 + F (cE (
))
(A7)
and
LK =
KG (cK (
))
1 +G (cK (
))
: (A8)
Standard di¤erential calculus proves that LE (
) dened in (A7) is monotone increasing
in 
, while LK (
) dened in (A8) is monotone decreasing in 
. Hence, the function
dened as their ratio, LK=LE (
), is unambiguously decreasing in 
. Given that it is

  LK=LE, a stationary equilibrium is a xed point of this function. We now prove
that this function admits one and only one xed point. Dene g (
)  LK=LE (
) 
.
There exist su¢ ciently low values of 
 such that g (
) > 0, as well as su¢ ciently high
values of 
 such that g (
) < 0.20 Given that g (
) is a continuous and monotone
decreasing function in 
, the intermediate value theorem guarantees the existence of
one and only one 
 such that g (
) = 0, that is, such that LK=LE (
) = 
.
Finally, it might still be the case that multiple equilibria exist, even though they are
all characterized by a unique ratio 
. This instance, however, can be excluded once
we realize that LE (
) and LK (
), dened in (A7) and (A8), are monotone functions
of 
.
20The standard assumptions on the matching function imply that
lim

!0
LK
LE
(
) = +1
and
lim

!+1
LK
LE
(
) = 0:
Even though they are not necessary, these two results ensure the existence of the two regions where
g (
) > 0 and g (
) < 0.
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How do we interpret equilibrium multiplicity? For the sake of illustration, suppose
that our economy admits two (non-degenerate) equilibria, respectively denoted by su-
perscripts O,P , with (Lj)
O > (Lj)
P for j = E;K (an example of this kind is developed
at the end of this section). These two equilibria can be interpreted as self-fullling
equilibria triggered, respectively, by optimistic or pessimistic expectations. Whenever
entrepreneurs expect a high number of nanciers to be matched with (LeK = (LK)
O
where the superscript e stands for "expected"), their number will be high as well, (LE)
O.
Similarly, whenever nanciers expect a high number of entrepreneurs (LeE = (LE)
O),
their number will also be high, (LK)
O. Equilibrium O can be labelled as the optimistic
(or thick) equilibrium. Via a totally symmetric argument, expecting few entrepreneurs
and nanciers entering into the market makes the agents converge towards the low-
entry equilibrium P , which can be referred to as the pessimistic (or thin) equilibrium.
Given that in our model only protable innovations are pursued, whenever multiple
equilibria exist, they can be Pareto-ordered from the lowest to the highest number of
innovations (matches) produced by the economy. Welfare is thus maximized at the
equilibrium characterized by the highest number of matches: all other equilibria are
sub-optimal and are the result of a coordination failure between entrepreneurs and
nanciers. In this respect, the model suggests that animal spirits matter in the process
of innovation, in the sense that, whether a high or a low activity equilibrium is reached
may depend on a self-fullling mechanism triggered by entrepreneursand nanciers
expectations. Usually, this line of argument provides the main theoretical justication
of policy intervention. We further discuss this issue in the concluding remarks.
Example. Consider the model developed in the previous sections and further
suppose that (i) the matching function (1) is Cobb-Douglas with increasing returns
to scale: M = ALEE L
K
K with  2 R+, E; K < 1 and E + K > 1, and that (ii)
entry costs are the same for every entrepreneur and every nancier, cE and cK .21 This
economy admits three stationary equilibria. The rst (thin) equilibrium is given by
the pair

(LE)
P ; (LK)
P

that solves the following system:22
21In some respects, this example resembles the one developed by Diamond (1982) in Section IX.
22Under constant returns to scale, this system is impossible (as it is made up of two equations in
one unkown, LK=LE), and hence this equilibrium disappears.
21
8>><>>:
cE =
L
E
E
L
K
K
LE
+cE
1+r+
cK =
L
E
E
L
K
K
LK
(1 )
1+r
:
(A9)
The second (thick) equilibrium is instead given by the pair

(LE)
O ; (LK)
O

that
maximizes market entry and thus the size of the innovation fair:(
(LE)
O = 

E   (LE)O

(LK)
O = K   (LK)O :
Finally, the third (degenerate) equilibrium is a sort of "no-innovation trap" and is
given by

(LE)
T ; (LK)
T

= (0; 0). It is possible to prove that the trap and the thick
equilibrium are stable, while the thin equilibrium is unstable.23
23The two best response functions in (A9) are in fact strictly convex whenever the matching function
is characterized by increasing returns to scale. The algebraic proof of this statement, as well as a
graphical intuition of the three equilibria, are available upon request from the authors. We omit them
for brevity.
22
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number of 
business 
angels 
number of 
deals 
number of 
submitted 
projects 
Austria no. obs. 11 11 11 
 
mean 71 5 66 
 sd 40 3 21 
Belgium no. obs. 8 8 8 
 
mean 161 36 222 
 
sd 135 10 79 
Denmark no. obs. 4 4 4 
 
mean 76 17 38 
 sd 86 29 30 
Finland no. obs. 9 9 9 
 
mean 210 8 36 
 
sd 152 6 13 
France no. obs. 4 4 4 
 
mean 2504 205 827 
 sd 1004 69 265 
Germany no. obs. 6 6 6 
 
mean 580 36 2309 
 sd 174 8 889 
Greece no. obs. 5 5 5 
 
mean 11 1 8 
 
sd 3 1 4 
Italy no. obs. 8 8 8 
 
mean 262 174 857 
 sd 32 146 625 
Netherlands no. obs. 8 8 8 
 
mean 196 50 178 
 
sd 189 24 75 
Norway no. obs. 3 3 3 
 
mean 133 3 37 
 sd 38 1 12 
Poland no. obs. 4 4 4 
 
mean 56 4 100 
 
sd 28 2 83 
Portugal no. obs. 4 4 4 
 
mean 18 1 5 
 sd 6 0 1 
Russia no. obs. 2 2 2 
 
mean 88 3 35 
 
sd 46 1 7 
Spain no. obs. 8 8 8 
 
mean 273 16 280 
 sd 197 10 181 
Sweden no. obs. 4 4 4 
 
mean 284 43 358 
 sd 157 28 306 
United Kingdom no. obs. 4 4 4 
 
mean 4959 245 558 
 
sd 465 100 282 
USA no. obs. 13 13 13 
 
mean 257802 56586 363341 
 sd 36919 11205 96498 
Total no. obs. 105 105 105 
 
mean 32352 7050 45318 
 sd 86079 19094 124513 
 
Table 1. Summary statistics. 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
A -3.5241*** -3.5375*** -2.2427*** -5.0414 -2.6440 
 (0.4215) (0.6246) (0.8482) (1.5066) (1.5569) 
δE 0.7296*** 0.6205*** 0.5615*** 0.7738*** 0.8879* 
 (0.1527) (0.1753) (0.1820) (0.1340) (0.4170) 
v 1.1263*** 1.1723*** 1.1407*** 1.5249*** 0.9450* 
 (0.0612) (0.1278) (0.1294) (0.4134) (0.3590) 
Ψ 0.3765 0.3332 -0.1658 -0.4123 -2.1804 
 (0.8937) (0.7561) (0.7833) (0.7686) (5.8105) 
Time trend YES YES YES YES YES 
Country group dummies NO YES YES NO NO 
Country dummies NO NO NO YES YES 
Country group specific time trend NO NO YES NO NO 
Country specific time trend NO NO NO NO YES 
N 105 105 105 105 105 
R-squared 0.84 0.85 0.86 0.89 0.93 
(v-Ψ)>0 p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0018 0.0055 
Ψ→0 p-value 0.6745 0.6604 0.8329 0.5931 0.7265 
CRS p-value 0.1076 0.1806 0.2796 0.2077 0.8857 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 2. Results of the nonlinear estimation of the log-CES matching function. 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Elasticities Elasticities Elasticities Elasticities 
βK 0.3834*** 0.3525*** 0.5983*** 0.5078*** 
 (0.0782) (0.1138) (0.1739) (0.1345) 
βE 0.6414*** 0.5861*** 0.3726*** 1.3356*** 
 (0.0695) (0.0814) (0.0886) (0.0553) 
βEK    0.0612** 
    (0.0266) 
βKK    -0.0547*** 
    (0.0184) 
βEE    -0.0852*** 
    (0.0118) 
Time trend YES YES YES YES 
Country group dummies NO YES NO NO 
Country dummies NO NO YES YES 
Country group specific time trend NO YES NO NO 
Country specific time trend NO NO YES YES 
N 105 105 105 105 
R-squared 0.945 0.957 0.995 0.999 
RTS 1.02 0.94 0.97 0.93 
CRS p-value 0.4266 0.3023 0.8467 0.1907 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 3. Results of the estimations of the log-log matching function specifications. 
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Figure 1. Diagnostic plot of standardized robust residuals versus robust Mahalanobis distance of 
the vector of covariates from the vector of their means. 
 
Note. The Mahalanobis distance of a multivariate vector x of p1  dimension with mean vector  and 
covariance matrix  is defined as:      μxΣμx  1TxD , which follows a chi-squared distribution 
with p degree of freedom under normality. Observations lying at the right hand side of the vertical limit (set 
at 
2
975.0,p ) are defined as good leverage points. Their presence does not affect the OLS-estimation but it 
affects the statistical inference since they do deflate the estimated standard errors. Observations lying above 
or below the area delimited by the two horizontal limits (set at -2.25 and +2.25, respectively) are defined as 
vertical outliers and affect the estimated intercept of an OLS-estimation. Observations lying both at the 
right hand side of the vertical limit and outside the 95% confidence interval of the Standard Normal are 
considered bad leverage points. Their presence significantly affects the OLS-estimates of both the intercept 
and the slope. 
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